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Chapter 13
How Have Public Sector Pensions Responded
to the Financial Crisis?
Andrew G. Biggs
Roughly four out of five employees of state and local governments in the
United States are covered by a defined benefit (DB) pension plan, versus
only around one in five private sector workers. Prior to the financial market
disruptions of recent years, public sector pensions were well funded, at
least according to their own accounting conventions.1 As of 2007, the
average public pension plan was 84.6 percent funded. In 2009, by contrast,
the average public pension plan was only 77.1 percent funded.2
This decline in pension health was largely due to a precipitous decline in
pension assets. These plans had increasingly invested in equities, rising
from roughly one-third of pension portfolios prior to the mid-1980s to
around two-thirds of assets prior to the financial crisis.3 While higher than
expected returns on equities allowed states to reduce pension funding
from around 6 percent of state budgets through the mid-1980s to around
3 percent prior to the crisis,4 the downside was higher sensitivity to annual
market returns. According to the Federal Reserve, state and local pension
assets declined by nearly $1 trillion from 2007 to 2008 and have yet to
regain their former value.
Since public pension plans generally assume an 8 percent return on
assets, this implies that, even today, plan assets are more than 25 percent
below levels projected as of 2007. Indeed, even if public plans returned 11.5
percent annually going forward, it would take them until 2020 to catch up
to asset levels projected prior to the financial crisis. This raises the question
of how public sector pensions have reacted to such changes. As a matter of
law and general plan stewardship, many plans have increased contributions
for employers and/or participants, helping assets catch up more quickly
with projected liabilities. Such changes have been the subject of political
debate in many states and localities. A number of states have attempted to
reduce the generosity of benefits, principally for newly hired employees but
also, in some cases, for current employees and retirees through reductions
in postretirement Cost of Living Adjustments (Pew, 2011). Public plan
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changes for current employees are often legally problematic, and it is likely
that many will be settled in court.
Here, however, we focus on investment practices to ask whether public
pensions have altered their investment plans since the financial crisis, and
if so, how? One hypothesis is that public pensions, with their focus on
longer time horizons, would make few changes to their investment prac-
tices in response to the large market shifts. Alternately, either increased or
decreased risk-taking are also plausible. Following the financial crisis and
the increased attention to the differences in risk between public pension
assets and liabilities, some plans might reduce the risk profile of their
pension investments. Yet, other underfunded pensions might seek to
recoup their losses by taking even more investment risk. This could be
portrayed as an irrational reaction, similar to a gambler ‘doubling down’
on risk, to make up for prior losses. Different plans in different circum-
stances could react in different ways.
To assess the direction of such possible changes, we first analyze how
public pension actual asset allocations changed between 2007, prior to the
financial crisis, and 2009. These changes will be due both to choices made by
plan managers and, more importantly, to relative increases and decreases in
the values of various asset classes. Second, we analyze changes to plan target
asset allocations from 2007 to 2010. While these allocations may not yet be
fully realized, the targets reflect the mix of risk and return that plan man-
agers seek to achieve and thus may be a better measure of managerial
intentions. Third, we estimate the risk of target portfolios in 2007 and
2010 to analyze how plans’ desired mix of investment risk and return may
have changed in response to the financial crisis and other factors.
Data employed
We use several sources of data to examine public plan financing and
investments. For information on the funding status of plans and changes
in plans’ actual portfolio allocations, we use the Center for Retirement
Research’s (CRR) Public Plans Database, which covers 126 plans over the
period 2001–9. However, the CRR dataset does not include information on
plan target portfolios. To obtain this information, we surveyed the annual
reports of twenty-nine large public pension plans, obtaining target asset
allocations for 2007 and 2010. In a small number of cases, data were
obtained through direct contact with plans. In cases in which 2010 data
were not available, we relied on plan 2009 target allocations. While not a
comprehensive sample, the combined assets held by these twenty-nine
plans comprise roughly 50 percent of total public pension holding as of
2010.
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Investment portfolios
The financial turmoil of recent years would play havoc with any investor’s
portfolio, requiring active rebalancing in order to maintain a given asset
allocation. Most public plans rebalance only gradually, allowing accumula-
tion differences in relative returns across classes to alter portfolio alloca-
tions. In particular, poor returns on stocks have shifted the equity share of
portfolios downward over time.
Figures 13.1 and 13.2 show the percentage of public pension portfolios
allocated to different asset types for the years 2007 and 2009, based on CRR
data for approximately 125 plans in each year. The data points represent
median values, while the bottom and top of the bars represent the 10th and
90th percentiles of the distribution.
Due to data limitations, asset classes are aggregated. For instance, domes-
tic and international equities are treated as a single class. From 2007 to
2009, the percentage of public pension assets held in equities declined
significantly, from a 2007 median of 60 percent in equities to 52 percent in
2009. Similarly, the share of pension portfolios held in bonds grew from
2007 to 2009, from a median of 24 percent of portfolios to 26 percent. Real
estate remained constant at a median value of 6 percent of assets, as did
cash at 1 percent. Alternate investments increased from a median value of
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Figure 13.1 Median public pension asset allocations, with 10th and 90th percen-
tiles: 2007
Source : Author’s calculations from Center for Retirement Research data (CRR, 2011).
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zero in 2007 to 2 percent in 2009. The ‘other’ asset class grew from a
median value of 1 to 6 percent. From an examination of a number of
plan reports, it appears that the ‘other’ investments often include assets
that could be termed as alternate investments, meaning that this data may
understate the uptick in alternative investment shares from 2007 to 2009.
Perhaps most striking is the increased range of portfolio allocations,
meaning greater heterogeneity in asset allocations from plan to plan. In
every asset class, the range from the 10th to 90th percentiles increased from
2007 to 2009. For instance, for equities, it grew from 21 percentage points
in 2007 to 26 percentage points in 2009; for bonds, it grew from 16 to 21
percentage points; and for real estate, from 11 to 15 percentage points. For
alternate investments, the range grew from 9 to 14 percentage points, while
for ‘other’ the range grew from 12 to 20 percentage points.
Target portfolios
It should be borne in mind that the changes in asset allocations shown
above were not primarily the result of manager choice. Rather, changing
market values caused an involuntary change in most public plan portfolio
allocations. To learn more about how intentions regarding asset manage-
ment have changed since the beginning of the financial crisis, next we turn
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Figure 13.2 Median public pension asset allocations, with 10th and 90th percen-
tiles: 2009
Source : Author’s calculations from Center for Retirement Research data (CRR, 2011).
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to public pension target asset allocations. The boards of most public sector
plans set and disclose a target asset allocation that they will seek to reach
and maintain over a period of time. How these targets change over time
reveals changing management attitudes to different asset classes and to the
overall risk profile that the plan seeks to maintain.
To gather information on target portfolio allocations, we focused on the
2007 and 2010 Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) of
twenty-nine large public pension funds, with assets representing around
half of total public funds under management. For each plan, we found the
target allocation as printed in the CAFR, and then tabulated those targets
into five broad categories: equities, bonds, alternative investments, real
estate, and cash. The results are displayed in Figure 13.3.
In 2007, almost 6 of 10 dollars in the median public pension portfolio
was invested in equities, with differing allocations to domestic and interna-
tional shares.5 Bonds made up about 1 dollar in 4 dollars, and alternative
investments—private equity, hedge funds, and the like—made up around
1 dollar in 10 dollars. Real estate made up around 6 percent of the average
portfolio, and cash constituted the remaining small amount. Yet portfolio
allocations were not uniform across plans. The difference between the 90th
and 10th percentile asset shares for equities was 19 percentage points; for
bonds, 16 percentage points; for alternative investments, 14 percentage
points; for real estate, 11 percentage points; and for cash, 1 percentage
point.
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Figure 13.3 Median target asset allocations, with 10th and 90th percentiles: 2007 vs
2010
Source : Author’s calculations from plan data.
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By 2010, target asset allocations had shifted significantly. Equities fell
from a median target share of 58 to 52 percent, while bonds and real estate
remained essentially even. The largest increase was for alternative invest-
ments, which rose from 9 percent of the median target allocation in 2007 to
13 percent in 2010. In effect, the fall in equities was largely replaced by
increased allocations to alternative investments. Moreover, heterogeneity
in target portfolios between plans also increased. The gap between the 10th
and 90th percentile portfolio shares increased for equities (from 19 to 24
percentage points), while remaining more or less steady for bonds (from
16 to 17 percentage points). The largest increase again came for alternative
investments, where the difference in asset shares between the 10th and
90th percentiles grew to 24 percent, a very high level given that the median
plan holds only 13 percent of its assets in alternative investments (and the
mean plan only 17 percent).
Evidently, target asset allocations have changed rather markedly since
the financial crisis, with pension fund managers indicating a rising interest
in alternative investments. Given the poor returns on equities in recent
years and pressures to maintain expected returns going forward, the shift
into alternate investments may be understandable. What is unclear from
the above data, however, is how this shift altered the level of risk that plans
take on. To help answer that question, next we estimate the risk of plan
portfolios for 2007 and 2010.
Risk of target asset allocations
Pension manager attitudes toward risk may have changed due to adverse
market performance in various ways. For instance, chastened by overexpo-
sure to equities, some might shift assets toward fixed-income investments,
thinking more along the lines of asset/liability management or liability-
driven investment. Others might seek to win back losses by retaining or
even increasing their risk exposure. Further, some might opt to ‘double
down’.
To our knowledge, no public plans publish their target portfolio risk in
their annual reports or actuarial valuations. This constitutes a significant
omission that makes it difficult for policymakers and the public to under-
stand the contingent liabilities that they face. But with certain simplifying
assumptions, we can estimate the risk of pension portfolios using projec-
tions from Wilshire Consulting (2011) regarding the mean returns, var-
iances, and covariances of a number of asset classes.
Table 13.1 shows Wilshire’s projected risk and return for the asset classes
included in our tabulations. Wilshire’s projections are available in more
detail than shown here, but due to limitations on target portfolio data
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provided by plans, it is necessary to treat assets at a more aggregated level.6
It is noteworthy that Wilshire’s projected returns are lower than those used
by most public plans. The typical public plan projects annual returns of
around 8 percent, while Wilshire projects a median return of only around
6.5 percent.
Table 13.2 reports a correlation matrix for pension asset classes. Using
these figures and Wilshire’s projections of annual asset risk, we calculate
the expected standard deviation of future portfolio returns for each plan.
For consistency, we use the same risk and correlation assumptions for both
2007 and 2010 target portfolios.
Table 13.3 reports summary statistics on these calculations. In 2007, the
mean public pension target portfolio had a projected standard deviation of
annual returns of 12.2 percent; for 2010, the mean standard deviation had
risen to 12.8 percent. (Medians for 2007 and 2010 were 12.2 and 12.5
percent, respectively.) In 2007, the 10th to 90th percentile range was
10.8–13.5 percent, a spread of 2.7 percentage points, while for 2010, the
range was 11.5–14.2 percent, a spread that also equaled 2.7 percentage
points. Yet, the standard deviation of portfolio standard deviations
increased from 1 to 1.2 percentage points. Thus, while there was some
widening of the differences in risk taken by plans, the more important
trend seemed to be a simple shift upward.
Table 13.1 Expected risk and return of pension asset classes (%)
Class Annual volatility Expected return
Equities 16.5 7.25
Bond 4.5 3.58
Alternatives 26 9.7
Real estate 15 5.5
Cash 0 0
Source : Author’s calculations using data from Wilshire Consulting (2011).
Table 13.2 Correlation matrix for pension asset classes
Equities Bonds Alternatives Real estate Cash
Equities 1 0.29 0.75 0.35 0
Bonds 0.29 1 0.32 0.15 0
Alternatives 0.75 0.32 1 0.35 0
Real estate 0.35 0.15 0.35 1 0
Cash 0 0 0 0 1
Source : Author’s calculations using data from Wilshire Consulting (2011).
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This increase in average plan risk-taking would be anticipated to boost
expected returns by approximately 0.15 percentage points, assuming that
portfolios were on the efficient frontier. From 2007 to 2009 (the most
recent year for the CRR’s Public Plans Database), the average projected
nominal return increased by 0.03 percentage points, from 7.91 percent in
2007 to 7.94 percent in 2009. This change was the net of a 0.03 percent-
age point reduction in assumed inflation and a 0.06 percentage point
increase in assumed real returns. One potential explanation is that plans
were taking more risk, not just to increase expected returns but merely to
maintain the returns they had already projected. This increase in plan risk
is likely to be significant given the investment losses that plans suffered, and
the increased policy focus on asset–liability management and on the mar-
ket valuation of pension liabilities. Indeed, the typical 2010 target alloca-
tion involved more risk than did almost two-thirds of plans in 2007.
The largest increases in portfolio risk were for the South Carolina Retire-
ment System (increase in standard deviation of 2.61 percentage points),
Illinois Teachers (2.59 percentage points), and Pennsylvania Employees
(2.14 percentage points). The largest reductions in target portfolio risk were
for California State Teachers (0.78 percentage points), Missouri Public
Schools (0.68 percentage points), and the Florida State Retirement
Board (0.47 percentage points).
Figure 13.4 details changes by plan. Eleven of the twenty-nine plans in
the sample had essentially unchanged risk, meaning a change of less than
0.3 percentage points. Fourteen plans increased risk by more than 0.3
percentage points, while four plans reduced risk by more than 0.3 percent-
age points.
It is difficult to tell why certain plans took the paths they did. For
instance, there is no simple correlation between the decline in a plan’s
funding ratio from 2007 to 2010 and its changed target portfolio risk. Of
course, if some plans reacted to funding declines differently than others—
some taking a more conservative route while others doubled down—such a
pattern would be difficult to discern from the data available.
Table 13.3 Summary statistics on public pension portfolio
standard deviations (%): 2007 and 2010
2007 2010
Mean 12.2 12.8
Median 12.2 12.5
10th 10.8 11.5
90th 13.5 13.5
Source : Author’s calculations (see text).
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Conclusion
The financial crisis and the subsequent recession generated significant
losses to pension assets, along with declines in plan funding rates. To
date, no comprehensive analysis has been conducted of how public DB
plans reacted to the volatility of markets since the financial crisis. We have
analyzed three aspects of pension funding: shifts in asset allocations due to
changes in market values, shifts in target asset allocations due to decisions
undertaken by plan managers, and estimates of the risk of plan target
portfolios in 2007 and 2010. We have also sought to analyze how risk-taking
by public pensions has changed over time.
Although equity price declines reduced the share of plan investments
held in stocks, plan target asset allocations have tended to increase risk,
often via a broader acceptance of alternative investments in public plan
portfolios. The typical pension plan in 2010 targeted a level of risk that
exceeded the rate of two-thirds of pensions in 2007. While the increased
risk taken by the median public sector pension was modest, a small number
of plans did significantly increase their target portfolio allocations, making
more plausible the view that some plans may boost risk as a means to
recover from market declines over the past several years. Nevertheless,
risk is a double-edged sword. Pension managers should carefully consider
the investment risk they are taking and make it explicit in pension reports.
Otherwise policymakers and the public will not be aware of the contingent
liabilities they face.
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Endnotes
1. The so-called ‘market valuation’ critique of public pension accounting argues
that discounting plan liabilities at the expected return on assets is misleading, as
liabilities are intended to be and in most cases are guaranteed, while assets are
risky. Discounting at a risk-adjusted interest rate would reduce plan funding
ratios by roughly one-half and increase unfunded liabilities by a factor of around
6. See Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) and Biggs (2010).
2. Derived by the author from the Center for Retirement Research Public Plans
Database (CRR, 2011).
3. Derived by the author from FRB (2011: table L 119 (A)).
4. As reported by Munnell et al. (2010).
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5. As above, due to data limitations, we aggregate domestic and international
equities into a single class. Breaking out international investments would have
reduced the sample size.
6. For instance, we combine domestic and international equities into a single class,
with a standard deviation of annual returns equal to the unweighted average of
Wilshire’s projections for the two classes.
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